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ARTICLES
ADR: DISPUTING WITH A MODERN FACE,




The Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) movement might
turn out to be one of the most important chapters in the history of
the American judicial system.  Or, it might not.  In its most grandi-
ose form, ADR turns disputing on its head, transferring control over
outcome from third-party decision-makers to the disputants them-
selves, and defining disputing procedure in ad hoc, party-con-
structed guidelines tailored to the circumstances rather than fixed,
generic, and categorical rules applicable uniformly in all situations.
In its less grandiose form, ADR simply institutionalizes a system of
multi-party bargaining in which third-party neutrals help disputants
identify individual interests and find common ground when they are
unable to do so by themselves but who, unlike judges, do not tell the
disputants how to act on that information once they have it.  Think
of this latter version of ADR as a system of bargaining for the bar-
gaining impaired.
Each version of ADR has its distinctive advantages and disad-
vantages, but both are susceptible to the well-known propensity of
administrative regulation generally to bureaucratize decision-mak-
ing by defining rights in collective rather than individual terms, stan-
dardizing outcomes, and giving repeat players disproportionate
* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  Special thanks
to Richard Boldt, Neil Dilloff, Doug Frenkel, Charlie Goetz, Lee Hall, Thom Main, and Charlie
Sullivan, for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article, and to Sue McCarty for her
customarily excellent work in putting the manuscript in proper form.
This article was completed in late 2019 before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and
thus does not discuss the effects of that pandemic (particularly the increased use of video tech-
nology in law practice generally), on the various forms of dispute resolution.  My focus here is on
the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of ADR generally, and not on the relative
merits of different ADR system designs or institutional formats.  I discuss online dispute resolu-
tion in Robert J. Condlin, Online Dispute Resolution: Stinky, Repugnant, or Drab, 18 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 753–55 (2017) and will revisit that topic at greater length in a future
article.
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power to call the shots.  If this happens with ADR, some of the most
important commitments underlying the American system of adver-
sary justice will be up for grabs.  It is difficult to know how the ADR
reform movement will play out, of course, since it is still early in the
process and, given ADR’s propensity to operate in secret, trustwor-
thy data is hard to come by.  But there is considerable reason to be
concerned about the unintended side effects of ADR and thus every
reason to keep it on a short leash.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proponents of the legal reform movement known as Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution (“ADR”)1 often ask why their approach to
disputing is not used more widely for all types of civil disputes.2
While acknowledging ADR’s widespread acceptance,3 they lament
the fact that many parts of the American civil4 justice system still
cling to the competitive and self-interested methods of adversarial
adjudication at a time when (allegedly) the adversary system has
become an anachronism and is on its way out.5  The reasons for this
1 Some define ADR to mean “Appropriate Dispute Resolution,” though it is not clear
whether “Appropriate” modifies “Dispute,” “Resolution,” or both. See Appropriate Dispute
Resolution Center, U. OF OR. SCH. OF L., https://law.uoregon.edu/explore/ADR (last visited Dec.
9, 2019).  Others use the term “process pluralism” as a synonym. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Process Pluralism in Transitional/Restorative Justice: Lessons from Dispute Resolution
for Cultural Variations in Goals Beyond Rule of Law and Democracy Development (Argentina
and Chile), 3 INT’L J. CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT & RESOL. 3 (2015).
2 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the Dream of ADR: Reflections on Four Decades of the
Quiet Revolution in Dispute Resolution, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513, 514 (2016)
(describing “how the Quiet Revolution [of ADR] has in some ways fallen short of the promise of
its early days”); See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn’t the World Gotten to Yes? And Appre-
ciation and Some Reflections, 22 NEGOT. J. 485, 492 (Sept. 27, 2006); See also Milton Heumann
& Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey:
“You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 253, 255 (1997) (finding
that seventy-one percent of attorneys adopt a positional or hard bargaining strategy in resolving
disputes); id. at 262–65 (lawyers describing why they continue to use adversarial dispute resolu-
tion methods).
3 See generally Thomas O. Main, Mediation: An Unlikely Villain, 34 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 537, 556–62 (2019) (describing the inroads ADR methods and systems have made into
some parts of the civil dispute resolution world, both in expanding their own jurisdictional reach
and shrinking the reach of formal litigation).
4 I limit discussion throughout the article to civil dispute resolution.  The overlay of consti-
tutional rights makes criminal prosecution and plea bargaining substantially different processes.
5 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation in Popular Culture: What Are We Bargain-
ing For?, L. & POPULAR CULTURE 583, 584 (Michael Freeman ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Nov. 19,
2004) (“[Analogies to] competitive sports or war-like struggles . . . no longer represent either the
growing scholarship on effective, efficient and more just negotiation practices or the evolving
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reluctance to go all in with ADR, I will argue, are relatively
straightforward and reasonably clear.  ADR systems are based on a
not always warranted trust in the ability and willingness of humans
to think and act from a communal perspective; an incomplete un-
derstanding of the origins and purposes of social cooperation; an
excessive faith in the capacity of informal and often algorithm-
driven systems to deal adequately with issues of fairness and jus-
tice;6 and a Eutopian7 belief in the possibility of a conflict-free so-
cial world.  At some level those in charge of designing dispute
resolution systems in this country seem to recognize this.
The debate over the comparative advantages of ADR is less
intense today than it was in the 1980s when it first surfaced in the
legal literature,8 and for most in the dispute resolution community
the debate is over, with ADR being the clear winner.9  ADR’s
methods are thought to be as, if not more, effective than those of
formal litigation, and writing about ADR is thought to be the prin-
practice of legal negotiation in the real world.”); Main, supra note 3, at 540 (“[F]ederal courts R
abandoned their commitment to trials around 1985.”); Professor Main provides an excellent his-
tory of the “vanishing trial” and “managerial judging” programs, with citations to all of the
relevant literature, and in an insightful addition, explains how the rise of ADR (mediation in
particular), was in major part responsible for the demise of litigation. See id. at 562–68.
6 Academics seem to have more faith than lawyers in the ability of algorithms to make
fairness and justice judgments. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Access to Digital
Justice: Fair and Efficient Processes for the Modern Age, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 637
(2017).  Lawyers understand that legal rules need to be interpreted, not just translated, and that
interpretation involves reasoning, not just thinking.
7 Thomas More coined the term Utopia to describe a fictional island of nearly perfect citi-
zens in the South Atlantic in his classic work of the same name.  He fashioned the term from the
Greek words ou* (“not”) and tovpoς (“place”), which translated literally mean “no place.”  The
concept has been narrowed somewhat in contemporary usage, however, and now is used princi-
pally to refer to a place that is considerably better than contemporary society but not perfect.
The homophone Eutopia, derived from the Greek eu\ (“good” or “well”) and tovpoς (“place”), to
mean “good place,” is used to describe such a place.
8 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); David Luban, Settle-
ments and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. J. 2619 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some
Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663 (1995).
9 It should be noted that many ADR types do not believe in winning and losing.  A promi-
nent member of the ADR community once scolded me in an email for thinking otherwise.  After
I had described us as being “on the same side” on an issue, she said: “You think there are sides,
there aren’t.”  That, of course is the statement of a side. See also Robert J. Condlin, “Every Day
and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and Meta,” or How Communitarian Bargaining
Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory), 23 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 231, 298–99
(2008) [hereinafter Every Day] (describing the legal dispute resolution debate); Robert J.
Condlin, The “Nature” of Legal Dispute Bargaining, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 393,
396–405 (2016) [hereinafter Legal Dispute Bargaining].
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cipal dispute resolution scholarship game in town.10  Having con-
quered the world of theory, ADR understandably seeks to repeat
its success in the world of practice11 by convincing lawyers and
judges to cast off the shackles of adversary advocacy and adopt a
more informal, party-controlled approach to resolving differ-
10 Practice manuals and specialty journals excepted, not many dispute resolution scholars
write about litigation or bargaining any more, unless it is about reforming the Federal Rules (and
that discussion looks like it will go on forever). See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Discovery,
71 VAND. L. REV. 1775 (2017) (describing the debate over the proportionality, cooperation, and
case management policies at the basis of the 2015 changes to the Federal Rules); Adam N. Stein-
man, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L. J. 1
(2016). But see Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 418
n.47 (2010) (noting that there has been “no major reform to the Federal Rules over the past
forty years in which the idea of deciding cases ‘on the merits’ was the principled motivation
behind the reform”).  Colleen Shanahan and her clinical law colleagues are a notable exception.
See, e.g., Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and
Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 215 (2018); Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter,
Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128 (2019).
11 Yogi Berra is reputed to have said that “in theory there is no difference between theory
and practice, but in practice there is.”  The more modern view would have it that “in theory
there is a difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is not.”  Or in the active
voice: “In theory, theory and practice are different, but in practice, they are the same.”  As you
might expect, Berra did not say any of this.  The original quotation comes from Benjamin Brew-
ster, a Yale undergraduate, responding to a criticism that he had made a philosophical error in
an essay published in a Yale student-run literary magazine.  But Walter Savitch usually is given
credit for the first mainstream publication of the line a little over one hundred years later, in
1984, when he published a computer textbook titled “Pascal: An Introduction to the Art and
Science of Programming” that included the anonymous ascription (the statement is describing as
having been “overheard at a computer science conference.” Where else?). In Theory There Is
No Difference Between Theory and Practice, While In Practice There Is, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR
(Apr. 14, 2018), https://quoteinvestigator.com/tag/benjamin-brewster/#return-note-18386-1.
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ences.12  So far, at least, that plan has had only partial success and I
will explain why I think that is so.13
II. ADR—THE VISION
Dispute resolution systems exist on a spectrum defined by for-
mal litigation on one end and private party bargaining on the
other.14  These two pure types differ from one another principally
in the way they allocate decision authority (i.e., to third-party deci-
12 One prominent ADR proponent describes the difference between ADR and litigation as
the difference between being a Shark and a Dolphin, though the Dolphin metaphor does not
work perfectly. See Lainey Feingold, Forget the Shark and Be a Dolphin: Advancing Client
Rights and Interests with Collaborative Negotiating Tools, 2019 LAWRENCE LECTURE AND NEGO-
TIATION COMPETITION, OHIO ST. U., https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/program-on-dispute-resolution/
academics/archived-events/lawrence-lecture-2019/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2020).  Dolphins have
their bad moments. See Henry Nicholls, Cute and Cuddly Dolphins Are Secretly Murderers,
BBC (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20160204-cute-and-cuddly-dolphins-are-
secretly-murderers (describing how dolphins “go in for sexual harassment, incest, and infanti-
cide”); Dolphin, Socialization, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolphin#Socialization
(last visited Nov. 21, 2019) (“Dolphins engage in acts of aggression towards each other.  The
older a male dolphin is, the more likely his body is to be covered with bite scars.  Male dolphins
can get into disputes over companions and females.  Acts of aggression can become so intense
that targeted dolphins sometimes go into exile after losing a fight.”).  As a friend put it: “Sounds
like Dolphins need a #MeToo movement.”  And, as another friend put it, sharks can be pretty
decent. See Heartbreaking and Heartwarming Tales of Social Sharks, Ya Like Dags?, SOUTHERN
FRIED SCIENCE (Sept. 12, 2012), http://yalikedags.southernfriedscience.com/heartbreaking-and-
heartwarming-tales-of-social-sharks/.
13 But see Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 6, at 638 (“While in the 20th Century ‘jus- R
tice from below’ replaced ‘justice from above,’ the 21st Century is moving in the direction of
‘digital justice’ in lieu of ‘traditional justice.’”).
14 In a sense, “lumping it” (i.e., living with a harm rather than trying to recover for it), de-
fines the end of the dispute resolution spectrum opposite litigation, but lumping it is a dispute
avoidance strategy more than a dispute resolution one. See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining With-
out Law, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 302–03 n.60 (2011-2012) (describing the option of “lumping
it”). See also WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED 9 (1988) (“One party [to a
dispute] may decide to ‘lump it,’ dropping her claim or giving in to the other’s claim because she
believes pursuing the dispute is not in her interest, or because she concludes she does not have
the power to resolve it to her satisfaction.”).  In the social science literature, the process of
“dealing with harms and injuries by forbearance rather than by informing the wrongdoer and
seeking redress is . . . [formally expressed as] avoidance or exit.”  Gerald R. Williams, Negotia-
tion as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1996).  Even ADR proponents lump it on
occasion. See Talia Engelhart, Knowing When to Accelerate and When to Brake, TMG NEWS-
LETTER, Fall 2019, at 10 (mediator explaining her decision not to pursue a claim against a scooter
company for medical damages caused when the brakes on a scooter she had rented from the
company failed and she crashed: because “it didn’t seem worth it to transform . . . an unfortunate
accident . . . [in]to a full-on dispute in which I would intentionally become an active partici-
pant. . . .[and] would transform the experience from a kind of crazy thing that happened to me,
to the bad feeling of having failed at something that I would have cared about more and more as
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sion makers rather than the disputing parties); structure the collec-
tion and presentation of evidence and argument (i.e., in fixed,
technical, and categorical procedures rather than ad hoc, personal,
and narrative ones); base outcomes on different types of normative
standards (i.e., legal rules, industry customs, and rules of profes-
sional conduct rather than practical exigencies, disputants’ per-
sonal values and beliefs, and community practices); and express
and enforce decisions and agreements (i.e., in public pronounce-
ments and state-enforced orders rather than private contracts and
voluntary compliance).15  ADR defines the end of the spectrum
characterized by informal procedures, flexible institutional struc-
tures, party-chosen normative standards, and voluntary compliance
with agreed-upon resolutions.  Litigation defines the other end and
a wide variety of hybrid programs, distributed unevenly between
the two pure types, makeS up the middle.16
While ADR methods and systems come in many forms,17 all
are essentially communitarian18 in nature based mostly on a set of
I put in more time and energy.”).  Ms Engelhart may have needed a lawyer, notwithstanding that
she was one.
15 These differences bleed into one another, of course, so that litigation and informal dispute
resolution systems work in tandem with, as much as independently from, one another and have
done so since the days of the Common Law and Equity. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-
Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism, HARV. PUB. L. WORKING PAPER No. 15-13 (Jan. 15,
2015) (describing the relationship of Equity to the Common Law). See also Robert H. Mnookin
& Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J.
950 (Apr. 1979) (illustrating the relationship of law to private ordering).
16 The most common ADR programs are: mediation (facilitated and evaluative), arbitration,
negotiation (including facilitated negotiation), minitrial, summary jury trial, early neutral evalua-
tion, pre-trial settlement conference, rent-a-judge, online dispute resolution, structured negotia-
tion, and community-based restorative justice.  The length of this list notwithstanding, ADR’s
most distinctive contribution to dispute resolution, as I see it, is its reconceptualization of disput-
ing as a problem-solving rather than adjudicating process (this represents a “paradigm shift” if
you will, in thinking about disputing, though use of that term should be an indictable offense),
more than its creation of a new set of dispute resolution institutions, systems, and programs. See
Robert J. Condlin, The Curious Case of Transformative Dispute Resolution: An Unfortunate
Marriage of Intransigence, Exclusivity, and Hype, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL., 676, n.228
(2013) (describing the origins of the term “paradigm shift,” its abuses by scholars over the years,
and its inapplicability to the social sciences).
17 Notwithstanding the variety of terms used to describe the different formats, Ken Kressel
and his colleagues found that in operation almost all of them reduce to two: outcome focused,
and relationship focused. See Kenneth Kressel et al., Multidimensional Analysis of Conflict Me-
diator Styles, 30 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 135, 157 (Jan. 14, 2013). See generally Michael Moffitt,
Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future of ADR in Law Schools (and a Data-
Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 26–27 (2010) (describing
models used to describe dispute resolutions courses in American law schools).
18 I use “communitarian” to make the link between ADR and the social and political theory
that “began in the upper reaches of Anglo-American academia in the form of a critical reaction
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beliefs and assumptions about disputes and disputing that include
or extrapolate from the following:
– Adversarial litigation and the advocacy practices associated
with it are inefficient, wasteful, polarizing, destructive, and
ineffective in resolving disputes much of the time;19
– Disputes, at their core, are based on mistaken perceptions of
interest20 as often as competing conceptions of the good;21
to John Rawls’ landmark 1971 book A Theory of Justice [and draws] primarily upon the insights
of Aristotle and Hegel . . . [to] dispute Rawls’ assumption that the principal task of government
is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and economic resources individuals need to lead
freely chosen lives.  [The theory is grounded on] . . . methodological claims about the importance
of tradition and social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or metaphysical
claims about the social nature of the self, and normative claims about the value of community.”
Daniel Bell, Communitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 4, 2001), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2016).  On communitarian-
ism generally, see DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS (CLARENDON PRESS
1993); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COM-
MUNITARIAN AGENDA (CROWN PUBLISHERS 1993); ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COM-
MUNITY (INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDIES INSTITUTE 1953); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF
THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (Robert N. Bellah ed.,
1985); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (Vintage Books 1st ed. 1992); DEREK L.
PHILLIPS, LOOKING BACKWARD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT
(PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1993).  The legal dispute resolution literature variously de-
scribes ADR as “collectivist,” “cooperative,” “integrative,” “coordinative,” “collaborative” and
the like. See Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753
(2004); James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolu-
tion, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 431 (2001-2002) (describing the self-styled “collaborative law”
program).
19 The critique of adversarialism was one of the foundational pillars of the Roscoe Pound
Conference of 1976, and the Conference usually is understood as the starting point of the mod-
ern ADR movement. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
(A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). See also Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note
6, at 640–41 (describing how courts are criticized for their “adversarial and rule oriented” na- R
ture); Shawna Benston & Brian Farkas, Mediation and Millennials: A Generational Shift in Dis-
pute System Preferences, 39 PACE L. REV. 645–48, 653, 657 (2019) (describing the incompatibility
of the “law-focused” “top down formalism” of litigation with the international experiences and
interdisciplinary education of millennials).  Learned Hand might be surprised to learn that mil-
lennials are the first to be “uniquely predisposed to” and “primed . . . at the margins, to avoid
litigation more than prior generations.” Id. at 645, 648. Hand is famous for “dread[ing] a lawsuit
beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.” See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies
of Trial to Reach the Heart of the Matter, 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 105 (1926).
20 The “interest/position” distinction is one of the most well-known contributions of Getting
to Yes, the first book on legal bargaining written for a general audience. See ROGER FISHER &
WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
The distinction was far from self-evident forty years ago. see Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the
Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 28–30
(1992) (finding no significant difference between the concepts of interest and position), and it
hasn’t become any clearer with time.
21 See Michal Alberstein, The Jurisprudence of Mediation: Between Formalism, Feminism
and Identity Conversations, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 5 (2009) (“Under the interpre-
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– Disputes are resolved best by identifying and reconciling in-
terests, wants, and needs rather than arguing about rights,
rules, and facts;22
– Trying to satisfy the interests of everyone in a dispute will
produce a more lasting resolution than trying to satisfy one’s
individual interests;
– Informal, ad hoc, flexible, and disputant-controlled methods
of proceeding are more likely to produce stable outcomes
than formal, generic, fixed, and third-party controlled
methods;23
– Respectful and friendly relationships contribute more to the
successful resolution of disputes than arguments about sub-
stantive rights;
– Reciprocal, transparent, and even-handed concessions lead
to satisfactory resolutions of disputes more frequently than
deceptive, self-interested and strategic offers and demands;
– The matters at stake in most disputes can be expanded to
provide something for everyone;24
– Non-monetary concessions (e.g., apologies)25 often are more
important items of exchange than monetary ones;
tive paradigm of mediation, the reality of the conflict does not exist outside the perceptions of
the parties . . . .”); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 909 (2004)
(“[S]tudies suggest there is often less ideological and practical distance between opposing moral
communities than individuals on each side of a dispute realize.”).
22 See generally Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limita-
tions of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All Just Get
Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 8–16 (2007).
23 See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 6, at 642 (describing benefits of informal dis- R
pute resolution processes); Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 656–58 (describing the benefits R
of party-controlled dispute resolution methods).  It is difficult to test this “stable outcome” claim
empirically, both because the necessary data is hard to come by, and because it is not clear what
sort of data, over what time frame, would suffice as proof.  For example, suppose a party walks
away from an ADR proceeding believing that her legal rights have been abused, but decides to
comply literally with the terms of the agreement anyway because not doing so would cost more
than it would be worth, in the process, however, she loses all respect for ADR methods and tries
to subvert the implementation of her agreement whenever possible.  Is the resolution stable?
The answer probably would have to be yes and no, and this illustrates only one of the difficulties
in testing the stability of informal resolutions empirically.
24 Max H. Bazerman, Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality Assumption, 27 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 211, 211–15 (1985) (criticizing the “mythical fixed-pie assumption” of distributive
dispute resolution and implying that integrative trade-offs between party interests are always
preferable and available).  A “something for everyone” resolution is sometimes characterized as
a “win-win” outcome—though that expression is confusing if one uses a consistent definition of
“win” from the first “win” to the second.  When someone wins, someone loses, by definition.
Win-win captures only part of the process.  There also is a lose-lose part.  It probably is best to
avoid breezy jargon of this sort altogether.
25 Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1021 (1999)
(describing how the communitarian move of apologizing “may . . . offer paths for spiritual and
psychological growth”).
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– Social, moral, and psychological reconciliation between par-
ties is as important a goal in disputing as economic compen-
sation and restitution;
– ADR methods and systems transform disputes from a for-
mal, competitive, antagonistic, and stylized process into a
flexible, cooperative, respectful, and conversational one, and
(some would argue) disputants themselves from “risen apes”
to “fallen angels.”26
This communitarian conception of disputing presupposes
a world in which people are always at their best, a world
of Houyhnhnms and not Yahoos27 in which disputants
“connect”28 with one another as persons and convert what could be
acrimonious fights into joint ventures29 and sometimes even lasting
friendships.30  This, in turn, takes the hard edge off their disputing
26 ROBERT ARDREY, AFRICAN GENESIS: A PERSONAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ANIMAL
ORIGINS AND NATURE OF MAN 47–48 (1961).
27 See JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS viii-xi (1996) (Dover Thrift Editions)
(describing the difference between Houyhnhnms and Yahoos).  Hippolyte Jean Giraudoux, the
Nineteenth century French dramatist, is reputed to have remarked that “only the mediocre are
always at their best,” though it is difficult to find where or when he said this. See Chapter &
Verse, 109 HARV. MAG. 31 (Mar.–Apr. 2007) (“[M]any websites attribute this judgment to Jean
Giraudoux but fail to provide a precise source.”).  Even Wikipedia fails in this regard. See Jean
Giraudoux, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Jean_Giraudoux (last visited Nov. 21,
2019).  The Yale Book of Quotations suggests two other possible sources for the statement: Max
Beerbohm (“[o]nly mediocrity can be trusted to be always at its best. Genius must always have
lapses proportionate to its triumphs,” in The Saturday Review, Nov. 5, 1904), and Somerset
Maugham, Variations on a Theme, in THE PORTABLE DOROTHY PARKER 602 (1944) (“Only a
mediocre writer is always at his best . . . .”). THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 50, 502 (Fred
Shapiro ed., 2006).  The idea is counterintuitive.  Even the mediocre must have good and bad
days (at least for them).
28 Leonard R. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindful-
ness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 56
(2002) (using the techniques of mindfulness meditation in negotiation will help a lawyer develop
“a sense of . . . connection with other people”); Deborah M. Kolb & Linda L. Putnam, Negotia-
tion Through a Gender Lens, 2 NEGOTIATION 59 (2004), reprinted in CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L.
RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS 468,
472–74 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the concept of “connectedness” in dispute resolution through
the lens of gender).
29 John Stuart Mill’s description of his working relationship with Harriet Taylor captures the
particular understanding of joint venture that I have in mind:
When two persons have their thoughts and speculations completely in common;
when all subjects of intellectual or moral interest are discussed between them in daily
life . . . when they set out from the same principles, and arrive at their conclusions by
processes pursued jointly, it is of little consequence in respect to the question of
originality, which of them holds the pen . . . .
JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 183–84 (Penguin Classics 1989) (1873).
30 See, e.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIAT-
ING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 7 (2d ed. 1991) (“[m]any people recognize the high costs
of hard positional bargaining . . . [and] . . . hope to avoid them by following a more gentle style of
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and makes it less antagonistic, less competitive, less deceptive, less
manipulative, less selfish, and less mean-spirited than it otherwise
might be.  In the process, parties to disputes create a kind of tem-
porary peaceable kingdom in which self-interest is not naked, force
is not brutish, entitlement claims are not legalistic, and everyone
acts in the spirit and to the limits of their communal potential.31
This is a hopeful vision of social life, and when true, is a source of
great comfort in a divided and fractious world.  But sadly, the com-
munitarian conception of disputing is too idealized to serve as reli-
able guide for resolving real-life disputes much of the time, and
communitarianism’s foundational dogma—that dispute outcomes
are natural, self-evident, and complementary32—is based on a vi-
sion of a world without scarcity and incompatible conceptions of
the good.33
negotiation. Instead of seeing the other side as adversaries, they prefer to see them as friends.”).
On the nature of friendship, see Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got To Do With It?” “It’s Not
Like They’re Your Friends For Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 250–70 (2004).
31 The human belief in a peaceable kingdom, one without enmity, rivalry, competition, con-
flict and the like, goes back to pre-biblical times and ancient myths.  The basic story had it that
things once were perfect, now they’re screwed up, and something (i.e., original sin) or someone
must be responsible for that.  Typically, women were blamed (e.g., Eve in the Garden of Eden),
which is ironic given the dominant role of women in the modern ADR movement. See generally
THE UTOPIA READER 17–26 (Gregory Claeys & Lyman Tower Sargent eds., 2d ed. 2017)
(describing “Utopianism before Thomas More”).
32 See, e.g., Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Prob-
lem-Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 916 (2000) (describing the “important observation of social
psychologist George Homans . . . [that] people often have complementary interests . . . and do
not always value things exactly the same (sic) way,” using the familiar ADR “icing and cake”
example as an illustration).  This dogma may be true principally for disputes between what
Anthony Appiah calls “constitutionally antagonistic groups,” though even these groups some-
times want what the other group wants simply because the other group wants it. See Kwame
Anthony Appiah, Negation as Affirmation, in THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 138–41 (2005).
33 Professors Benston and Farkas argue that the present generation of millennials is uniquely
adapted to interacting with others in a spirit of compromise and collaboration, highlighting their
common interests and moving past their surface level differences. See Benston & Farkas, supra
note 19, at 655, 665 (“[Millennials’] financial risk aversion, interdisciplinary educations, and un- R
precedented exposure to diverse communities nationally and internationally” make them more
“likely to be able to promote a greater spirit of compromise and collaboration, regardless of
background.”).  Perhaps this is true, but the claim seems to overlook the nationalism, isolation-
ism, and wall-building xenophobia widespread among millennials, and to contradict one of the
most basic principles of social organization, that “tools evolve, people don’t.”  See John Gray,
Getting Better All the Time? N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 19, 2019, 76 (reviewing ALLEN BUCHANAN
& RUSSELL POWELL, THE EVOLUTION OF MORAL PROGRESS: A BIOCULTURAL THEORY (2018))
(“A commingling of ethical and evolutionary concepts and theories is one of the cardinal confu-
sions of modern times,” and “Evolution is one thing, progress in ethics and politics another.”).
See also PETER FRANKOPAN, THE SILK ROADS: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD (2017)
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Disputing is a complex social phenomenon in which the need
to trust, share, and cooperate co-exists with the need to deceive,
conceal, and compete (“create” and “claim” in Lax and Sebenius’
felicitous concepts34).  Disputes can be about conflicts that are real
as well as perceived,35 be based on incompatible values and beliefs
as much as mistaken perceptions of interests and facts and be re-
solved by argument36 and compromise as much as investigation
and discovery.  Lawyers seem to recognize this complex nature of
disputing and mix communitarian and adversarial methods and
techniques together in their practice in a kind of dispute resolution
pastiche, responding to different kinds of disputes (and different
kinds of issues within disputes), in different kinds of ways.  They
seem to understand that communitarian behavior is an essential
part of disputing, but also that an exclusively communitarian ap-
proach will produce gifts as well as fair distributions, and that gift
giving (at least the unselfconscious and unintended kind), is not a
necessary part of resolving disputes.
(describing how the Mongols dealt with the same issues of social organization facing modern day
societies and resolved them in much the same way).
34 See DAVID LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–41 (1986)
(describing the “Negotiator’s Dilemma: Creating and Claiming Value”).
35 But see Albertstein, supra note 21; Seul, supra note 21, at 909 (describing how conflict R
does not exist outside the perception of the parties); Welsh, supra note 18, at 753 (equating R
perceptions of fairness with fairness in fact in disputing). But see Benston & Farkas, supra note
19, at 664 (“[M]illennial lawyers and mediators will be particularly equipped to find common R
ground among disputants in the process and not just the result.”).  The view that good process
can substitute for bad outcome ignores the truism that “process fades, results last.” See, e.g.,
Paula Reed Ward, Girl’s Mother Calls Settlement with Pittsburgh Public Schools Unfair, PITTS-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 2010, at B5 (example of a settlement amicably arrived at did not
prove adequate over time).
36 John Stuart Mill once explained why substantive disagreements can be worth arguing
over:
Those, who having opinions which they hold to be immensely important, and their
contraries to be prodigiously hurtful, and [who] have any deep regard for the general
good, will necessarily dislike, as a class and in the abstract, those who think wrong
what they think right, and right what they think wrong . . . .
MILL, supra note 29, at 57.  An aversion to error, continued Mill, partakes “in a certain sense, of R
the character of a moral feeling.” Id.  This does not mean that one should be a “fanatic,” or
“insensible to good qualities in an opponent,” but one should “throw [one’s] feelings into [one’s]
opinions” since it is “truly difficult to understand how anyone, who possesses much of both,
[could] fail to do [this].” Id.  This can be true even when the differences between contending
positions are about matters that are thought sacred. See, e.g., BART EHRMAN, LOST CHRISTIANI-
TIES: THE BATTLES FOR SCRIPTURE AND THE FAITHS WE NEVER KNEW 160–61, 181–202 (2003)
(describing the “vitriolic attacks,” “polemical treatises,” and “personal slurs” used by early
Christians in arguments over dogma).
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III. ADR—THE ASCENDANCE
Legal reform movements, particularly large and successful
ones like ADR, usually are a response to a wide variety of con-
cerns and serve a wide variety of interests, and the ADR move-
ment is no exception.  Several forces, both intellectual and
practical, have combined to give it life.  The first, as I have men-
tioned, is the now widely held belief that the American system of
adversary litigation no longer works (at least for many types of civil
disputes).37  The argument is a familiar one.  Litigation was in-
tended to be a fair-minded, deliberative, and respectful process for
resolving good-faith disagreements about rights and obligations in
accordance with consensus legal norms,38 but in operation it often
devolves into stylized shouting matches in which practical leverage,
lawyer skill, and forum selection have a greater influence on out-
come than the strength of the parties’ legal claims.39  Even when
litigation works as designed, it forces courts to resolve disputes in
reductionist, win-lose terms40 that often ignore the idiosyncratic
features and comparative merits of different types of legal rights.41
Moreover, access to skilled representation gives institutional liti-
gants who can afford the best lawyers a powerful advantage over
one-time players who cannot; and lawsuits can take so long to con-
clude that a party’s claims can become moot as a practical matter
long before they are resolved as a legal one.42  For a wide variety of
37 See Condlin, Every Day, supra note 9, at 238–45 (describing the critique of adversarial R
litigation); Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, supra note 14, at 289–90 (same).  Again, I limit my R
comments to civil litigation.  The criminal judicial system presents a different set of issues and
concerns.
38 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 669 (1976) (describing argument as “that area of ra-
tional discourse . . . where men seek to trace out and articulate the implications of shared pur-
poses . . . [that] serve as ‘premises’ or starting points”).  In legal disputing these starting points
consist of “norms of general applicability derived from sources outside the immediate dispute.”
Id.  In Fisher, Ury and Patton’s well-known phrase, such norms are described as “objective crite-
ria.” FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 30, at 81–93 (describing objective criteria). R
39 See Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 655 (“The litigation process is designed to mag- R
nify areas of disagreement, whether or not those areas are central to the underlying dispute”).
40 See Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 651 (“[M]illennials can be particularly frightened R
of the prospect of an all-or-nothing resolution”).
41 See Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 547 n.52 (describing the “demerits” of litigation as R
“binary outcomes; unpredictable results; publicity and lack of privacy; generalist (non-expert)
judges; ignorant, emotional, and/or biased juries; and formalities that can intimidate, marginal-
ize, and chill.”).
42 DELAYING PROCEEDINGS UNTIL THEY NO LONGER ARE COST EFFECTIVE TO PURSUE OFTEN
IS DONE FOR STRATEGIC REASONS. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS:
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reasons, these and others, large parts of the Academy and Bar have
given up on litigation as an adequate system for resolving many
types of ordinary civil disputes.
Dissatisfaction with litigation, by itself, would not have pro-
duced a program to remake civil dispute resolution in its entirety
had there not been a fully developed substitute to put in litigation’s
place.  Lawyers and legal scholars would have lived with litigation’s
deficiencies, as they had for generations, on the principle that a
broken system is better than no system at all.  But ADR came to
the rescue by providing a set of procedures, normative standards,
decision-making techniques, and institutional structures that (alleg-
edly) would resolve civil disputes more efficiently,43 conveniently,
and fairly than formal litigation,44 and if this is true it would be too
good of an opportunity to pass up.  The hard question is whether it
is true.
Informal dispute resolution is not new with ADR.  Private,
face-to-face bargaining has been part of the system of adversary
adjudication for as long as there has been a system of adversary
adjudication.  But in the 1970s and 1980s legal scholars reconceptu-
alized private party bargaining in systemic and institutional terms,
transforming what had been a lawyer skill practice into a formal
decision-making system and institution in its own right.45  These
scholars then combined this reconceptualization with real life em-
pirical data drawn from private programs for resolving low-stakes,
HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 56 (1994)
(“The Diaghilev of discovery seems to have been the late Bruce Bromley, a leading partner at
Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Bromley once boasted to an audience of Stanford law students, ‘I
was born, I think, to be a protractor . . .  I could take the simplest antitrust case and protract [it]
for the defense almost to infinity . . .  [One case] lasted 14 years . . . Despite 50,000 pages of
testimony, there really wasn’t any dispute about facts . . .  We won that case, and, as you know,
my firm’s meter was running all the time – every month for 14 years.’”).
43 The efficiency argument has several strains. See Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 546 R
n.47 (“For some, ADR offered an escape from the formality of court processes; . . . Others saw
efficiency gains based on predictability, by substituting expert decisionmakers for lay Juries. Still
others viewed ADR as an opportunity to offload a public expense.”).
44 ADR’s business plan, so to speak, is to provide a free-standing alternative to the litigation
system and steal that system’s customers by offering lower prices and better service.  One might
think of ADR as a kind of dispute resolution Blockchain.
45 The Roscoe Pound Conference of 1976 usually is given as the starting point for the emer-
gence of ADR as a phenomenon in its own right, but there are informal dispute resolution
systems and institutions dating back to the 1930s.  Professor Main provides an excellent history
of the slow and incremental nature of the rise of ADR in all of its manifestations over that
longer time period, while also acknowledging the central role of the Pound Conference. See
Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 542–49 (describing “The birth of the modern ADR movement R
[as] the enduring legacy of the Pound Conference.”).
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commercial disputes arising mostly out of online transactions, to
argue that ADR could work as effectively (and be accepted as le-
gitimate), in large-scale public disputes as in small-scale private
ones.  Several public entities (e.g., nation states,46 states of the
union, and government agencies), were intrigued by the argument
and decided to test it by creating formal ADR programs of their
own.47  Those tests are still being graded.
In addition to a dissatisfaction with adversarial litigation and
the availability of a full-fledged alternative to it, the rise of ADR
also is based on the strongly held belief among many legal scholars
and lawyers that the resolution of disputes (as well as the practice
of law generally), is excessively and unnecessarily conflictual.48  It
may seem odd to think of lawyers and legal academics as uncom-
46 See, e.g., Louis Del Duca et al., Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce: De-
veloping a Global Online Dispute Resolution System, 1 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 59 (2012)
(describing the “Anatomy of a Global ODR System”); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shack-
elford, Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?,
35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 485, 492–510 (2014) (describing ODR programs in India, Mexico, Canada,
and the European Union); Colin Rule, Technology and the Future of Dispute Resolution, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2015, at 6 (“Many national governments and international agencies have
examined the challenge of cross-border redress over the past 10 years and concluded that ODR
is the future.”); Jason Tashea, Order in the (Virtual) Court, ABA J., Winter 2019-2020, at 26
(describing the Chinese system of virtual courts); ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY
GROUP, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR LOW VALUE CIVIL CLAIMS
(2015), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Fi-
nal-Web-Version1.pdf (report of the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales making the
“case for ODR” and recommending the creation of an online dispute resolution program for
English courts); LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE REVIEW: INTERIM REPORT
75–88 (2015), https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/online-dispute-resolution-for-low-value-civil-
claims-2/ (describing the implementation of a new online dispute resolution program for En-
gland and Wales).
47 I describe some of these programs in Robert J. Condlin, Online Dispute Resolution:
Stinky, Repugnant, or Drab, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 724–33 (2017).
48 See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract and Collaboration: The End of
the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 516, 531
(2005) (describing how some lawyers do not “relish” the standard adversarial conception of law-
yer bargaining role and would like to change it to create a work environment that is more per-
sonally compatible); Julie Macfarlane, The New Advocacy, in AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 513 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris-
topher Honeyman eds., 2006) (reporting the account of one lawyer as: “My nature, my personal-
ity has always been much more collaborative. I struggled to get that adversarial model to begin
with. It never felt right.”); Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 8, at 83 GEO. L. J. 2663 R
(1995) (“I have trouble with polarized argument, debate, and the adversarialism that character-
izes much of our work.”).  Whether lawyer comfort should play a role in determining the best
dispute resolution system for clients is a difficult question.  Sometimes it is better if lawyers who
do not like conflict refer clients to other lawyers who are not similarly encumbered.
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fortable with conflict.49  Conflict is one of the defining features of
much legal work and resolving it is one of the legal system’s princi-
pal tasks.  Moreover, the sentiment seems particularly out of place
in a country whose “taming factions” structure of government as-
sumes that conflict is inevitable and needs to be managed rather
than suppressed,50 and whose economic system is based on the
“unhindered competition of selfish and ambitious interest
groups.”51  Hoping for conflict-free disputing in a culture defined
by conflict seems quixotic at best.
These concerns notwithstanding, many in the legal academy
and profession have written evocatively about the destructive ef-
fects of conflict in life generally and their admiration for those who
have been able to eliminate it from their legal work.52  A former
academic expresses the point this way: “Conflict is dangerous, all
our trade-flapdoodle notwithstanding.  It can be very costly and
given its interactive essence none of us can safely assume that we
can handle it well enough to avoid those costs.  Time, money, emo-
tional wear, frayed relationships into the future, diminished self-
esteem, the impact of the self-perception that one has lost, the fear
that the other’s self-perception of having lost will result in retalia-
tion are just a few of the costs.  Thus, minimizing conflict, whether
through reframing or avoidance, has a great deal to recommend it
much of the time.  Selecting when to confront is an art form unex-
plored in our trade.  The raw material with which we work—us—is
very poorly fitted to the purpose of sensibly resolving conflict.”53
49 Or, maybe not.  Just as sociopaths to psychiatry, children to puppies, and moths to flames,
wusses may be drawn disproportionately to law.  Professor McClurg explores one of the possible
causes.  Andrew Jay McClurg, Neurotic, Paranoid Wimps—Nothing Has Changed, 78 UMKC L.
REV. 1049, 1052 (2010) (describing “the neurotic, paranoid wimpiness” of first year law
students).
50 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 71–79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of factions.”).
51 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION 166–67 (2007) (describing the framers’ accept-
ance of the Adam Smith argument that the “unhindered collision of selfish and ambitious inter-
est groups” is the driving force of capitalism).
52 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes
of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L. J. 553, 560 (2006) (“In the back of my legal services office was
one woman lawyer, who, instead of bringing dramatic class action lawsuits, quietly cultivated
relationships and negotiated good outcomes for her clients.”); Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, R
at 662 (“[M]illennials . . . reject careers based on adversarial methods of problem-solving”).
53 Email to author (Nov. 1, 2009) (on file with author). See also Susan L. Podziba, Conflict,
Negotiation, and Public Policy Mediation in the Trump Era, 35 NEGOT. J. 177 (2019) (“[C]onflict
is expressed as passions that simplify all things complex and obscure doubt.”); Engelhart, supra
note 14, at 10 (a mediator describing how it wasn’t worth pursuing a personal claim for medical R
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This is a cri de coeur as much as a factual claim or policy argument,
of course, and nothing short of eliminating conflict from disputing
altogether will satisfy it completely.54  ADR systems and methods
do not promise to eliminate conflict from disputing altogether, but
they do promise to move disputing in that direction and that makes
ADR “any port in a storm” for many in the dispute resolution
community.  For understandable reasons, therefore, reconfiguring
civil dispute resolution along ADR lines has moved to the top of
the reform agenda for many legal academics and lawyers, but diffi-
cult questions remain.  If ADR is the cure for litigation’s evils why
has the profession not already remade litigation along ADR lines?
What does this hesitancy tell us about ADR’s limitations and, more
importantly, what does it tell us about its future?
IV. ADR—THE CONCERNS
The American legal system’s reluctance to adopt ADR meth-
ods across the board for all types of civil disputing seems based on
a number of factors, four of which stand out: 1) a fear of unin-
tended consequences in reconfiguring a complex and long-standing
regulatory system all at once;55 2) a concern that the advantages of
ADR are not all they are made out to be; 3) a worry that ADR will
damages because it would turn a “crazy thing that happened” into a “bad feeling at having failed
at something.”). But see Daniel Ortiz, Nice Legal Studies 1, 5 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Research Paper Series, No. 2009-12, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1474402 (“I suggest we need to face up to . . . conflict. Niceness may make us feel
better but only because we fail to see its partiality and violence. . .  Disagreement and conflict
can . . . serve a healthy social function. If nothing else, they can focus us on our ideals, our
imperfections, and our differences and let us see—sometimes painfully—how law actually
works. And just as important, the discomfort they bring can galvanize us into productive . . .
action.”); Jane Mansbridge et al., The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative
Democracy, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 69 (2010) (“In all deliberative theories, disagreement, conflict, argu-
ing, and the confrontation of reasons pro and con are crucial to the process.”); Rabinovich-Einy
& Katsh, supra note 6, at 656 (“[T]he goal [of ADR] is not—and should not be—to eliminate all R
conflict, This is neither possible nor desirable.”); Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of
Expanding Social Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 115, 125 (2010) (“[W]e will not approach a
problem-free world, for people are capable of identifying or inventing new problems as quickly
as the old ones are solved.”).
54 The dogmatic, in-your-face manner in which the comment is framed almost guarantees
disagreement and thus conflict.  In a sense, the statement is a conflictual response to the exis-
tence of conflict, embodying the quality it criticizes, seemingly without irony.  Expressions of this
nature often are more about exercising personal demons than making analytical points.
55 Cf. Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 565–67 (describing the unexpected effects of the R
development of mediation on the pleading and summary judgment Rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
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create new fairness problems in the process of resolving old ones;
and 4) reservations about the ability and willingness of humans to
resolve differences in an exclusively cooperative manner.
Start with whole-system reform.  With all of its warts, the
American system of adversary justice has worked more or less suc-
cessfully for several generations and correcting its deficiencies
would seem to be a more manageable task than replacing it com-
pletely.  The decision to start over needs an additional explanation,
and the principal candidate is a kind of “enough already” argument
based on what one might think of as a problem of social entropy.
Social systems, like physical systems, can degrade with age.  Parties
become skilled at exploiting a system’s weaknesses for individual
advantage; when the exploitation becomes widespread, the sys-
tems’ weaknesses become more salient than its strengths; and when
compensating for the weakness on a case-by-case basis becomes a
never-ending story, starting over56 begins to look like a more at-
tractive option.  It is not surprising, therefore, that pressure for a
whole-system reform of adversarial adjudication would emerge at a
time when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and their state
law equivalents) have come to be seen as instruments for “beating
every ploughshare into a sword”57 more than efficient and fair pro-
cedures for collecting evidence and structuring legal analysis and
argument.  The Rules have been rewritten many times in their sev-
enty-plus year history, yet the problems persist,58 so it was only a
matter of time before sentiment for something entirely new and
different would emerge (at least for small-scale, routine, and stan-
dardized disputes), and ADR embodies that sentiment.
Whole system reform has problems of its own, however, and
until one has a sense of how it will play out, it is difficult to know
whether it will be worth the candle.  In considering the question of
how ADR will play out, one might take a lesson from an equally
ambitious dispute resolution reform project of an earlier era—the
creation of Equity Jurisprudence and the Courts of Chancery in
Thirteenth Century England.  If ADR is the second coming of Eq-
56 Like theories of statutory interpretation, the reform movement dominant in any body of
thought at any point in time usually identifies where one has broken in on a circle rather where
one is located on a developmental track.  It is important to continue to try understand things at a
deeper level, of course, but expecting one’s insights to be something completely new under the
sun is myopic.
57 MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980).
58 See, e.g., Honorable Paul W. Grimm, The Future of Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1775
(2018) (describing the changes in the Civil Discovery Rules over the years to respond to and
prevent abuses). See also supra note 10. R
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uity, and in a limited sense it is,59 it is fair to expect that it will
follow a similar life path: begin as an uncomplicated and efficient
system for resolving disputes the existing judicial system does not
handle well; become encrusted with embellishments, add-ons, and
modifications over time as it confronts unanticipated problems and
identifies previously unrecognized wants and needs; be tweaked,
retrofitted, and refined to counteract the unexpected effects of the
embellishments, add-ons, and modifications; and ultimately be ab-
sorbed into the existing system altogether when the tweaks, re-
trofits, and refinements become unworkable in their own right.60
Equity was a procedural and substantive reform designed to
provide an alternative to Common Law courts for certain kinds of
claims, but it ended up being a gloss on the Common Law system
more than an alternative to it, and the transaction costs in making
this transition were considerable.61  If this is ADR’s destiny, and
there is evidence that it may be,62 it might make more sense to
work on adapting adversary adjudication to modern disputing than
to reconstruct the system of disputing from scratch.63  The weak-
nesses and limitations of adjudication are well known and can be
neutralized, circumvented, and overcome by skilled practitioners,
judges, and lawmakers on a case-by-case basis,64 but the weak-
nesses and limitations of ADR will remain under the radar for
some time to come, doing real but unrecognized damage.  An ide-
alized conception of any regulatory system can be a useful yard-
59 See generally Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329 (2005).
ADR also traces its lineage, in part, to the American Small Claims Court system but it differs
from both it and Equity in significant ways.  ADR resembles Equity, for example, in allowing
parties to tell their stories in an informal and narrative manner, and it resembles Small Claims
Court in making this process inexpensive and convenient, but it differs from both on the all-
important feature of control over the outcome.
60 Tweaks, retrofits, and refinements always will be needed in a regulatory system grounded
in moral and political values and beliefs.  Morality and politics are not static states.
61 See Smith, supra note 15. R
62 The embellishment process already may have begun.  The most prominent example at the
moment is the proposal to create a separate and distinct set of rules of professional conduct for
ADR practice. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 28 S. TEX. L.
REV. 404, 407–54 (1997); Julie Macfarlane, Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of Conduct
and the Potential of a Reflective Practice Model, 40 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 1, 49–87 (2002).
63 But see Shanahan & Carpenter, Simplified Courts, supra note 10, at 131–32 (Court simpli- R
fication reforms “do not solve the symptoms of the larger underlying problem: state courts . . .
have been stuck with legal cases that arise from the legislative and executive branches failure to
provide a social safety net in the face of rising inequality.”).
64 This happens on a regular basis. See, e.g., Order, V5 Technologies v. Switch Ltd. et al., No.
2:17-cv-02349-KJD-NJK (D.C. Nev. July 19, 2018), https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1065000/
1065270/https-ecf-nvd-uscourts-gov-doc1-11517243564.pdf.
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stick against which to judge more limited measures, of course, but
ideal conceptions should be turned to in their own right only as a
last resort65 since they tend not to take the practical limitations of
real-life circumstances and the psychological limitations of real-life
people into account.  While the ADR horse is out of the barn, so to
speak, the direction and distance it will travel have yet to be deter-
mined, and somewhere the ghost of Santayana will be watching.66
Assuming that the prospect of an ADR makeover of civil dis-
pute resolution is on the table, however—and it is—one must ask:
“What are its benefits? What warrants the disruptions it will pro-
duce beyond the fact of disruption itself?67  ADR’s most frequently
cited benefits are its lower cost and increased convenience.68  ADR
systems, it is said, are cheaper to install and easier to operate than
litigation-based judicial systems because they do not require brick-
and-mortar facilities, and they can be run, at least in large part, by
software and machines; they do not rely completely on highly com-
pensated humans.69  They also are said to be more convenient to
65 Last resorts aren’t always what they’re cracked up to be. See THE EAGLES, The Last
Resort, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Asylum Records 1976), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bO
JiTskr6w.
66 See 7 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA: THE LIFE OF REASON
82 (Prometheus Books, 1998) (1905) (“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it”).  Also, the ghosts of Hegel and Marx. See KARL MARX, THE 18TH BRUMAIRE OF
LOUIS BONAPARTE 15 (2008) (“Hegel remarks somewhere that facts and personages of great
importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy,
the second as farce.”).  For an excellent discussion of not letting the perfect be the enemy of the
good, the so-called Nirvana Fallacy, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L. J. 1219, 1230 n.33 (1994).
67 CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (2016) (describing the benefits of disruption); CLAYTON CHRIS-
TENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION (2013) (same).  In law, unlike business, disruption is not
always a good thing, but then it may not always be a good thing in business as well. See Jill
Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong, THE NEW
YORKER, (June 24, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-ma-
chine; Andrew A. King & Baljir Bataartogtokh, How Useful Is the Theory of Disruptive Innova-
tion?, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Sept. 15, 2015), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/how-useful-
is-the-theory-of-disruptive-innovation/. See also Disruptive Innovation, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disruptive_innovation (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
68 See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 6, at 639–40.  ADR proponents usually describe R
these advantages as providing greater “access to justice,” id. at 642–44, but this phrasing con-
flates “access” (i.e., “cost and convenience”) with “justice” (i.e., fair treatment), and the two are
not the same thing. “Access to justice” is a two-part expression, not a single word. See infra
notes 119–121, and accompanying text. R
69 Some “automated” systems are run by humans. See David Lee, Tech Firms Give Up Their
Awkward Secret: Humans, BBC.COM (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
49455363 (describing how the processing of personal data by Microsoft, Facebook, Google, Am-
azon, and others often “includes both automated and manual [i.e., human] methods of process-
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use than judicial systems because most of the time they require
only the virtual, and not actual, presence of parties and evidence,
and virtual presence can be arranged from almost anywhere.70
Cost and convenience are relevant factors to take into account
in designing a dispute resolution system to be sure, but since an
ADR makeover of civil disputing is likely to make more IA (intel-
ligence augmented) than AI (intelligence substituted)71 contribu-
tions to the final system design (removing humans from the tasks
of collecting, sorting, computing, and organizing evidence and ar-
gument but not the tasks of judging the significance of that evi-
dence and argument and explaining it to the world at large),72 its
benefits are likely to be limited to eliminating low-wage, clerical,
administrative jobs more than high level, expensive, professional
ones.  This will result in some savings in some kinds of disputes
(principally low-stakes, standardized, routine, and commodifiable
ones), some of the time, and in those instances the savings often
will be enough to justify the reform.  But in absolute dollars, the
money saved by an ADR makeover of civil disputing generally is
likely to be small in comparison to the cost of a dispute resolution
system as a whole, and in some instances it could even increase the
cost.73  The cost savings argument will support the case for ADR
reform in some circumstances, therefore, but by itself it will not
justify an across-the-board adoption of ADR methods for all types
of civil disputing.
ing,” though the companies do not always tell users that).  Sometimes ADR makeovers replace
lower paid judges with higher paid arbitrators, who often are the same judges now retired in
order to be paid at the higher arbitrator rate.
70 I once joked (though many did not see it as a joke) that in the ADR vision of heaven
parties will resolve disputes sitting on a couch, in a bathrobe, with a drink in their hands, looking
into a monitor, and typing on a keyboard, or talking to Alexa on an Echo.
71 See Murali Doraiswamy, Forget AI. The Real Revolution Could be IA, Paper presented at
the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2017/01/forget-ai-real-revolution-ia/ (describing the difference between IA and AI).
72 See Condlin, Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 47, at 744–50 (describing the limita- R
tions of algorithms in making the reasonableness determinations required by complex questions
of law and morality).  There is no removing humans from the judgment part of dispute resolution
short of dehumanizing the process.
73 One of the principal reasons private ADR systems fail is because they are too expensive
to operate and maintain. See Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Technology, Eth-
ics, and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L.
485, 628–29 (2014) (“[M]ost, if not all, of the prior providers [of ADR services] have ultimately
failed . . . due to cost associated with the maintenance, upkeep, and service of the [ADR] plat-
form.”).  If ADR’s cost savings are to be realized by moving dispute resolution online, as many
ADR supporters propose, the savings also will have to be discounted by unequal treatment
suffered by those with less access to, familiarity with, and skill at using online technology.
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If cost and convenience were the only issues, the debate over
ADR would be a lot simpler, but ADR systems introduce new fair-
ness concerns that cost and convenience benefits, even if substan-
tial, might not outweigh.74  The biggest concern is ADR’s failure to
provide a body of publicly available decisions for parties to consult
when considering whether to agree to a proposed resolution to a
present dispute.75  Humans are predisposed by evolution and natu-
ral selection to demand equal treatment in their disputes with
others,76 and not being able to compare a proposed resolution to a
present dispute with the resolutions of similar disputes by others in
the past denies disputants  a major part of the information needed
to know whether they are being treated equally.  This lack of access
to substantive precedent, so to speak, inevitably reduces disputing
to strategic trading, the assertion of personal force, and the manip-
ulation of practical leverage, and this in turn, deprives the process
of much of its normative content and undercuts its claim to moral,
legal, and political legitimacy.
Denying access to information about past outcomes seems
particularly strange for a dispute resolution program whose princi-
pal structural innovation is the addition of a third-party “neutral”
to the disputing process.77  A neutral asks questions and makes
74 Equating saving money with doing justice seems overstated and may indicate that even
ADR proponents feel the need to bolster the gravitas of their project.
75 Given the popularity of confidentiality clauses in ADR, the lack of publicly available in-
formation about past decisions is almost a structural feature of the system.  In effect, participants
in ADR systems are denied the “analytics” available to parties who litigate. See infra note 91.
This feature was criticized first by Owen Fiss (and discussed extensively by David Luban and
Carrie Menkel-Meadow), in the 1980s, see supra note 8, though Professor Fiss was concerned R
about the harm to the dispute resolution system as a whole more than the harm to individual
parties in particular cases.
76 See Condlin, Nature of Legal Dispute Bargaining, supra note 9, at 405–07 (describing the R
basis of the neurobiological predisposition to be treated equally); Russell Korobkin, A Positive
Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L. J. 1789, 1817–18 (2000) (describing the “Importance of
Fairness” in negotiation and the relationship of the merits of a case to the legitimacy of a negoti-
ated agreement); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 38, 389
n.32, 390–401 (2010) (describing a “long line of research in both psychology and . . . economics
. . . establish[ing] that individuals care about the fairness of the outcomes they receive” in
negotiation).
77 See Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 541 (“The modern ADR movement . . . promoted R
the idea that disputes could be resolved through intervention by trained professionals.”).  The
addition of a neutral makes ADR a middle ground between private ordering and judicial litiga-
tion.  Much like the tribal elder of the distant past, the neutral acts as a wise, impartial, and
trusted third party who helps disputants define their disagreements and identify ways to accom-
modate them but does not tell them what to do.  Also like the elder, the neutral has no personal
stake in the dispute and seeks only to bring it to a conclusion as fairly, efficiently and conve-
niently as possible.  The principal downside of such a system is the risk of unequal treatment.  A
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suggestions that help parties identify issues, clarify positions, and
consider courses of action they would not have thought of on their
own.  In doing this, the neutral (in effect, if not literally) tells par-
ties how others have managed the same kinds of disputes in the
past78 and draws on this knowledge to suggest ways to proceed in
the present that would not have occurred to the parties had they
been left to rely on their more limited personal experiences.  It
seems strange for ADR to include a mechanism for incorporating
“process” information of this sort from past disputes into its system
of dispute resolution, and yet not provide an equivalent mechanism
for incorporating the often more important information about past
outcomes.  Not only are the two stances inconsistent in principle—
one in favor of informed parties and the other against it—but fail-
ing to provide information about past outcomes gives repeat play-
ers (who can collect the information on their own) an advantage
over one-time players (who cannot), and this in turn makes ADR
susceptible to the familiar criticism of administrative regulation
generally, that it promotes repeat player bias.79
neutral is effective to the extent he or she is able to help disputants understand their differences
and find common ground, but not all neutrals are skilled at these tasks (their advertised
proficiencies notwithstanding) or adapted to all kinds of disputes.  The fact that ADR operates
in private adds to the problem since it effectively insulates neutrals from public review and this,
in turn, makes it difficult for one-time participants (but not repeat players), to know what kinds
of risks they are taking in working with one neutral versus another.  Asking someone with no
understanding of dispute resolution systems or providers to resolve differences in such circum-
stances is a little like asking them to compete in a curling match without telling them how points
are scored.
78 To be clear, I do not mean that a neutral says explicitly to the parties “this is the way
others have dealt with this problem in the past and you should do it that way as well,” but
instead, that a neutral’s suggestions, questions, and concerns about how to proceed inevitably
will be based on practices observed in similar disputes in the past.  What else?
79 Repeat player bias often is discussed in the legal literature under the concept of “regula-
tory capture.” See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 548, 624 (1969) (“Because regulatory commissions are of necessity intimately involved in
the affairs of a particular industry, the regulators and their staffs are exposed to strong interest-
group pressures.  Their susceptibility to pressures that may distort economically sound judg-
ments is enhanced by the tradition of regarding regulatory commissions as ‘arms of the legisla-
ture,’ where interest-group pressures naturally play a vitally important role.”); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“[A]s a rule,
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”);
Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly
Man, 82 YALE L. J. 871, 876 (1973) (“[A] kind of regular personnel interchange between agency
and industry blurs what should be a sharp line between regulator and regulatee, and can com-
promise independent regulatory judgment. In short, the regulated industries are often in clear
control of the regulatory process.”).  Marc Galanter has perhaps the most widely known discus-
sion. See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974). See also Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott,
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The risk of repeat player bias is a particular problem for dis-
pute resolution systems that rely heavily on algorithms since algo-
rithms are both secret and biased: secret in the sense that they are
proprietary in nature and thus known only to their creators and
owners, and biased in the sense that they tend to favor certain
types of parties and certain types of claims.80  Parties who use such
systems on a regular basis are able to identify the normative stan-
dards embedded in the algorithms and manipulate those standards
for individual advantage, but one-time users will learn only that
they have won or lost, and not why.  One could try to correct this
imbalance by refining the algorithms to equalize the advantages for
both parties, but ADR providers will have little incentive to do this
since secrecy hides the bias and bias generates business.  It is easy
to see how.
The choice of a dispute resolution system typically is made at
the beginning of a legal relationship, memorialized in the docu-
ments formalizing the relationship (in click-through agreements or
small-font text), and controlled to a greater or lesser extent by the
more powerful party to the relationship (e.g., landlord rather than
tenant; creditor rather than borrower; employer rather than em-
ployee; acquirer rather than target; and the like).81  Each party has
Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 205, 218 (2016) (“[W]e know that knowledge of court proceedings is one of the
primary advantages that repeat players have over individuals who only attend a single
proceeding.”).
80 See Jonathan Shaw, Artificial Intelligence and Ethics, HARV. MAG. Jan.-Feb. 2019, at 44,
49–50, http://www.harvardmag.com/pdf/2019/01-pdfs/0119-HarvardMag.pdf (describing “just
how difficult it can be to counteract bias” in AI systems, “to fight back against . . .  the percep-
tion—still dominant within the machine-learning /AI community—that everything is fundamen-
tally an optimization problem, or a prediction problem, or a classification problem.”). See also
note 82 infra.  On bias in algorithms, see generally Algorithmic Bias, WIKIPEDIA, https:// R
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithmic_bias (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).  Professors Rabinovich-Einy
and Katsh argue that algorithms will produce “more fair outcomes for various parties” because
they will curb biases in human decision making by treating everyone (or every dispute) in the
same way.” See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 6, at 648.  But for this argument to be R
correct it needs an “of the same class” qualification.  ADR systems treat all repeat players in the
same way, and all one-time players in the same way, but they do not treat all repeat players in
the same way as all one-time players.  The argument also overlooks the fact that equal treatment
is a component of justice, but not a synonym for it. Fair outcomes also are important. See Main,
Mediation, supra note 3, at 546–47 n.47 (the argument that ADR will improve access to justice R
“splinters, with some emphasizing access and others justice.” See also Robert J. Condlin, Online
Dispute Resolution, supra note 47, at 744–50 (describing “The Limits of Algorithmic Expertise”). R
81 See Stipanowich, Quiet Revolution, supra note 2, at 533–35 (describing how “for all practi- R
cal purposes. . . assent [to a dispute resolution mechanism is] often not informed or knowing and
the choice of process [often is made] unilateral[ly] by the company,”—discussing binding arbitra-
tion); Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 6, at 533 (describing how the choice of arbitration is R
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an interest in choosing a system that gives it the best chance of
having future disputes resolved in its favor, but the more powerful
party to the relationship will be able to protect that interest more
effectively than the weaker party by choosing a dispute resolution
provider that has a reputation for being sympathetic (or unsympa-
thetic) to its kind of claims.82  Given this practical reality, choosing
a dispute resolution system upon entering into a legal relationship
is as important as choosing a forum in filing a lawsuit, since the
choice will have a predictable effect on the outcome of future dis-
putes and also will provide one of the parties with a home court
advantage.  The denial of a completely impartial system will be un-
fair to non-repeat players, of course, but there will be little they
can do about it.  In fact, given the low-visibility manner in which a
dispute resolution system is selected, most of the time they will not
even know that it has happened.  The issue of forum selection, so
critical in litigation, does not go away in ADR, it simply changes
form.
Some respond to “fairness” criticisms of ADR by arguing that
the ability to avoid fairness issues is one of ADR’s “primary advan-
“to some degree practically foreclosed, or often effectively made by default”). See also Main,
Mediation, supra note 3, at 564 n.135 (explaining that courts “enforce arbitration agreements in R
routine transactions involving customers and other vulnerable parties who entered into contracts
of adhesion where the drafter of the clause chose the arbitrator and the claims concerned statu-
tory rights”).
82 See, e.g., Ethan Katsh & Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know About Online
Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REV. 329, 336–37 (2016) (“Statistics show that [the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization and National Arbitration Forum] rule in favor of trademark holders
approximately 85% of the time,” in domain name dispute decisions); The ABA Task Force on
Best Practices for ODR (Online Dispute Resolution) was concerned enough about the problem
of repeat player bias to recommend that ODR providers disclose “the number of cases resolved
in favor of businesses [and] the number of cases resolved in favor of the consumer” in “regular
periodic statistical reports . . . published online that permit a meaningful evaluation” of the
provider’s services.” ABA COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, REPORTS ON THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 3.6 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf; id. at 6 (recommending “dis-
closure of all matters that might raise a reasonable question about the impartiality of the ODR
Provider,” including contractual relationships with merchants, trade associations, businesses, and
personal relationships, financial interests, and the like). See also Main, Mediation, supra note 3, R
at 539 n.8 (describing the anti-litigation reforms of the “Fourth Era” on American Civil Proce-
dure as having “anti-law enforcement and pro-business effects”).  There may be a small market
for truly neutral ADR systems, but it is not likely to be big enough to support a single business,
let alone an entire industry.  Parties who want a neutral dispute resolution system go to Court.
Courts also have biases (documenting this is what judicial analytics is all about), but the bias is
for substantive views about law and not types of parties or claims.  Courts do not need to market
their services to any particular constituency, their caseloads are provided to them, so they are
free to decide disputes on an “objective” basis.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\21-2\CAC206.txt unknown Seq: 25 12-JUN-20 10:33
2020] ADR: DISPUTING WITH A MODERN FACE 315
tages.”83  It is enough, they say, to resolve disputes on terms that
parties find “satisfactory:” if the parties are satisfied, then the reso-
lutions are fair by definition.84  Support for this argument comes
mostly from responses to exit surveys in social-science, bargaining-
game research in which participants express satisfaction with their
experiences even when they do not do as well as other parties play-
ing the same bargaining games, but it is difficult to know what to
make of these responses.  The parties could be expressing satisfac-
tion with the disputing process itself,85 for example, rather than the
fairness of their results, saying that they were treated respectfully
and could “live with” the results, not that they were happy with
them.86  Or, they could be saying that they thought the stakes in-
83 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 826 (1984) (noting that one of the “primary advan-
tages” of the problem-solving method “is that no judgment need be made about whose [legal]
argument is right [and whose is] . . . wrong”). But see Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If
Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 191 (2002)
(describing how “fairness issues abound in ADR”).
84 See Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 656–57 (determining “the appropriate remedy or R
just distribution is for the parties themselves to do. . . . [parties can have] differing perspectives
on justice”).
85 See Condlin, Every Day, supra note 9, at 276–96 (describing “The Empirical Case for R
Communitarian Bargaining”).  The social science research often concludes, among other things,
that bargainers are willing to concede substantive entitlement claims in return for being treated
“fairly” (i.e., respectfully), in the negotiation process, particularly if the stakes involved are not
large and the single dispute is the total universe of data on which the “outcome-process” trade-
off is based. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Remov-
ing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1135–363
(2000) (describing the findings of social science research on dispute resolution); Russell
Korobkin & Joseph Doherty, Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
162, 163 (2009) (“As a first approximation, the legal merits of the lawsuit matter, of course. . .
But there is much more to settlement negotiations than the facts of the dispute and the relevant
legal rules. . .  [because] the legal merits of a case cannot be measured precisely.”); Donna Shes-
towsky, Misjudging: Implications for Dispute Resolution, 7 NEV. L. J. 487, 490 n.12 (2007)
(describing how research finds that under certain conditions laypeople are willing to trade “sub-
stantive justice” for “procedural justice,” if asked about it after the fact); Hollander-Blumoff,
supra note 76, at 398 (“[P]eople reject outcomes that are economically favorable to them be- R
cause they do not comport with norms of [procedural] fairness.”); Korobkin, supra note 76, at R
1822–25 (describing the relationship between “Procedural Fairness” and “Substantive Fair-
ness”).  From a disputant’s perspective, trading substance for procedure often will be ill advised.
A dispute usually is resolved quickly but its consequences could be felt well into the future.  If
the money traded for respectful treatment runs out sooner than expected, for example, or is less
than the law authorizes, see, e.g., Ward, supra note 35 (describing a party who changed her mind R
about the fairness of a settlement agreement after the fact), the client will have learned that
respect and fairness are not always the same thing, but it will be too late to act on that insight.
86 See, e.g., Engelhart, supra note 14, at 10 (a mediator explaining that she decided not to R
pursue a personal claim for substantial medical damages because of the “significant emotional
and resource costs” in resolving a conflict.”).
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volved were not worth arguing about any further, particularly if
holding out for more would cost additional time, unpleasantness,
and stress, and not that the results were fair.87  They might have
seen the bargaining exercises for the games that they were.
If the survey responses reflect the parties’ considered judg-
ments that their results were fair, on the other hand, the answers
might not mean what they say.  Perceived fairness is not the same
thing as fairness in fact, and to know whether results are fair in fact
one would need to know (among other things) how they compare
with the results reached by others resolving the same or similar
disputes.88  The parties might have mistaken their adversaries’ re-
spectful and attentive social behavior (points mentioned frequently
in the answers), as evidence of fair results,89 but there is no neces-
sary connection between respectful and attentive social behavior
and fair results.90  Without information about other outcomes,
form-over-substance standards of this sort are all that is left to
judge how well one has done, but form-over-substance standards
are notoriously easy to manipulate, particularly for repeat players
who engage in the dispute resolution process over and over again,
87 See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution
Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 93
(2008) (“Ex ante attraction did not predict ex post global satisfaction when disputants used a
nonadjudicative [dispute settlement] procedure.”).
88 It has long been known that reported satisfaction does not reflect actual satisfaction when
the parties’ ability to understand and report accurately on their mental processes is limited. See
Richard E. Nisbet & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Re-
ports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 255 (1977).
89 The ADR literature describes the difference between respectful treatment and fair out-
come as the difference between procedural justice and substantive justice.  Donna Shestowsky,
Misjudging: Implications for Dispute Resolution, 7 NEV. L. J. 487, 490 n.12 (2007) (describing
how research finds that under certain conditions laypeople are willing to trade “substantive jus-
tice” for “procedural justice”); id. at 491 (“Counterintuitively, people’s ex post reactions to their
dispute resolution experiences are not even driven by whether or not they ‘won’ their case.
Rather, after the dispute has ended, disputants typically evaluate the procedure they used in
non-instrumental terms, by considering how fairly they were treated rather than on the outcome
they obtained.”).
90 Professors Benston and Farkas describe how law student subjects in a mediation role play-
ing exercise reported that they were “willing to sacrifice a monetary outcome. . . for a collabora-
tive rather than a hostile and adjudicative dispute resolution mechanism.” See Benston &
Farkas, supra note 19, at 657–58.  The Professors do not say if the students knew how their R
outcomes compared with those of other students in the same exercise, however, and thus do not
discuss the possibility that the students’ satisfaction might have been based on the mistaken
assumption that they did as well as everyone else.  Being law students, at least some of them
probably would have been unhappy to learn that others had done better.  This may be another
instance of perceived fairness being falsely equated with fairness in fact. See Welsh, supra note
18, at 753 (equating the perception of fairness with actual fairness). R
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day after day.91  Without knowing more about the comparative
value of the parties’ individual results, therefore it is difficult to
know how much weight to give their expressions of satisfaction in
measuring the fairness of those results.92
Attempts by scholars to deal with this and other fairness issues
in ADR largely miss the mark.  The problem is a substantive one.
To resolve disputes fairly, parties must examine and evaluate op-
posing views in an informed, norm-governed, open-minded, and
evidence and reason-based manner,93 but ADR systems hide much
of the information needed to do this and the ADR literature pro-
vides guidance mostly on how to be sociable, respectful, psycholog-
ically sophisticated, and linguistically adept.94  These latter qualities
are important parts of disputing behavior no doubt, but by them-
selves they do not tell one how to resolve substantive disagree-
ments accurately, or how to reach results that are best justified by
the evidence and argument, and only the latter have a direct con-
nection with fairness in fact.  ADR’s form-over-substance ap-
proach to dispute resolution seems based on the belief that
91 Informal collections of ADR decisions might spring up in response to this problem, of
course, legal analytics is everywhere.  (Except in France where it is a criminal offense to collect
analytical data on courts and make it available (i.e., sell it) for use in legal representation. See
Jason Tashea, France Bans Publishing of Judicial Analytics and Prompts Criminal Penalty,
A.B.A. J. (June 7, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/france-bans-and-creates-crimi-
nal-penalty-for-judicial-analytics. See also Tom Martin, The Future of AI in Legal Tech: What
Will the Law Allow? L. PRAC. TODAY (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/
the-future-of-ai-in-legaltech-what-will-the-law-allow/?utm_source=Dec19&utm_medium=
email&utm_campaign=Dec19LPTemail (describing the “regulatory backlash against legal AI”
across the world prohibiting offering services to clients without lawyers involved in the process).
But most of the information in these collections is likely to come from repeat players and thus
have the trustworthiness of gossip, the even-handedness of house history, and the continuing
accuracy of telephone games.
92 It would have been interesting to learn what the participants thought of their outcomes
after they had been told the complete range of outcomes in all of the exercises.  The problem is
reminiscent of the debate about whether student course evaluations should be completed before
or after grades have been released.
93 I discuss how this is done in Condlin, supra note 14, at 311–27. R
94 The British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) featured prominently at the recent
ABA Techshow provides a representative example. See, e.g., Matt Reynolds, Online and ‘Intelli-
gent’ Dispute Resolution Benefits are Touted at ABA Techshow, ABA J. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba-techshow-panelists-tout-benefits-of-online-and-intelli-
gent-dispute-resolution.  In listing tips for productive negotiation conversation, for example, the
CRT website advises one to “[l]isten carefully to learn. . .. Don’t interrupt;” “Be calm, polite, and
respectful;” “Use ‘I’ language, such as ‘I would like us to . . .’ or ‘I think. . .;” “avoid broad ‘you’
statements, such as ‘You always’ or ‘You never. . ..” See, e.g., Tips for Successful Negotiation,
CIV. RESOL.FALS TRIBUNAL, https://civilresolutionbc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Tips-for-
successful-negotiation.pdf.  One searches the website in vain for advice on linking outcome with
substantive standards.
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arguments about legal rights are inevitably a waste of time because
“there are [always] cases on both sides,”95 but anyone who believes
that does not believe in the rule of law.96
If ADR systems could overcome the problems of entropy, re-
peat player bias, and lack of substantive standards, it still does not
follow that they would be an adequate substitute for formal litiga-
tion in all types of disputes.  ADR systems are based on the as-
sumption that parties to disputes are able and willing to resolve
their differences from a communal perspective, sharing informa-
tion openly and honestly, and protecting the interests of their ad-
versaries equally with their own.  But opportunities to exploit the
weaknesses of others for individual gain arise regularly in disputing
and asking parties not to take advantage of those opportunities
asks them to act counter to basic neurobiological predispositions
that humans inherit from evolution and natural selection.97
Consider the following commonplace example.  A proponent
of communitarian disputing (call him Joe), believes he can con-
vince the other party to the dispute (call him Addie), and the par-
ticipating neutral (call him Nevie), that what he (i.e., Joe) believes
to be a false argument is in fact true.98  Joe does not know if the
95 See Robert J. Condlin, “Cases on Both Sides”: Patterns of Argument in Legal Negotiation,
44 MD. L. REV. 65 (1985).
96 Professors Benston & Farkas may tacitly acknowledge this when they say legal “rules are
designed to create fairness and predictability [but] . . . they can hamper creativity, honesty, and
broader communication that can give disputants a fuller understanding of one another’s inter-
ests.” See Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 657. R
97 See Condlin, The “Nature” of Legal Dispute Bargaining, supra note 9, at 405–07 (describ- R
ing the human neurobiological predisposition to compete).  If taking advantage of another’s ig-
norance was consistent with ADR principles, it is not clear what would distinguish ADR from
litigation.  How would it be an “alternative” system?
98 Cf. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80
%93Ribbentrop_Pact (last visited Dec. 22, 2019).  I am not assuming that Joe will make up facts
or law to support his argument.  An argument can be “false” in the sense I use the term if an
informed and intelligent person should not believe it and this could happen for many reasons.  A
witness needed to establish a factual predicate for the argument might no longer be available;
new caselaw may have changed the dominant interpretation of the governing legal standard; a
party’s interests, needs, and wants may have changed from those initially expressed; and other
important factors known only to the party making the argument may have changed.  Admittedly,
argument based on made-up facts or law is rare, but weak arguments (i.e., those based on factual
omissions, unreasonable interpretations of law, changed circumstances, and the like) are com-
mon in disputing, and using arguments of this sort to take advantage of an adversary’s ignorance
will conflict with communitarian principles much of the time.  A reader might think this kind of
taking advantage could not happen in disputes between skilled and informed parties, but I de-
scribe an example of a pre-trial conference involving highly skilled, fully informed lawyers, and
an experienced United States District Court judge resolving a complex Title VII Employment
discrimination case, in which it did. There are many more such examples. See Robert J. Condlin,
Bargaining With a Hugger, supra note 22, at 70–86. R
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argument will convince Addie (and Nevie), but if it does he (i.e.,
Joe) will get a much better than average result, and if it does not he
will suffer no repercussions, now or in the future, for having tried
it.  If the argument convinces him, Addie will blame an unfavora-
ble outcome on the weakness of his own argument,99 will not resent
Joe for having (what he mistakenly thinks is) the stronger argu-
ment and will accept the disappointing result as all that was possi-
ble under the circumstances.  If the argument does not convince
Addie, Joe will abandon it and it will play no further role in the
dispute.  Addie might even think his rejection of the argument was
the reason Joe abandoned it and think more of Joe more kindly for
having done so.
Trying to convince Addie (and Nevie) to believe a false argu-
ment, however, is a competitive move more than a cooperative
one.100  It is grounded in deceit, not honesty, and seeks to exploit
ignorance, lack of preparation, weakness of will, intolerance for
conflict, and other such personal qualities and features of the situa-
tion rather than deficiencies in Addie’s substantive argument.
Asking Joe not to make the argument when the upside return is
great, and the downside risk is small, however, will be a hard sell
most of the time, particularly if Joe believes that being friendly,
personable, open-minded, and respectful in making the argument
(which he will be) is being cooperative enough.  He might even
think that Addie can take care of himself in substantive conversa-
tion and that failing to make the argument would be paternalistic
and insulting.101  Opportunities to deceive with impunity (and justi-
fications for doing so) arise over and over again in disputing and
expecting Joe (or anyone) not to exploit them will prove disap-
pointing most of the time, and understandably so.
The process of reciprocal concessions leading to an agreement
is another taken-for-granted example of the inevitability of compe-
tition and deception in disputing.  A party cannot know in advance
99 See Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 657 n.38 (describing how lawyers meeting pri- R
vately with clients emphasize “weaknesses in one’s own case to set realistic expectations”).
100 I describe how argument can be made in a respectful, friendly, and conversational manner
in Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, supra note 14, at 311–27.  There is no contradic- R
tion between being respectful and friendly and taking advantage.
101 Joe might say, echoing the view of some ADR proponents, that Addie’s being convinced
by the argument is enough to justify using it.  Addie knew his situation better than Joe did, and
something must have explained his acceptance of the argument.  Sometimes this rationalization
will be correct, and it always will be available as a justification for acting deceptively, but most of
the time it is likely to be the invocation of wish, in the service of self-interest, at the expense of
principle.
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the most an adverse party will give (or the least it will take) to
resolve a dispute, and thus must frame demands and offers in in-
flated terms to protect against leaving money on the table,  avoid
take-it-or-leave-it behavior that looks like a refusal to bargain, and
provide room to back away from early positions that turn out  to be
unrealistic.  When both sides to a dispute do this, the resulting se-
quence of mutual, reciprocal, and exaggerated demands and offers
is dispute resolution’s principal mechanism for enabling each party
to learn the most the other will give (or take) to resolve the dis-
pute.  For the process to work, however, the parties must make
demands and offers that are both true and false at the same time:
true in the sense that the parties would be willing to resolve the
disputes on the terms stated, but false in the sense that they also
would be willing to give more (or take less) if pressed to do so.
This bipolar quality of demands and offers makes the concession
process in disputing both competitive and cooperative: competitive
in the sense that the demands and offers are imbalanced in one’s
favor, but cooperative in the sense that one or more of the de-
mands or offers might be in both parties’ interests to accept.
Communitarians believe in disclosing interests, needs, and
wants honestly, fully, and openly but disingenuous arguments, ex-
aggerated demands, and stylized concessions are dishonest, mis-
leading, and selective.  One might think of demands and offers of
this sort as just harmless hyperbole for effect, the sort of talk one
expects in disputing and that no one takes literally.  But overstated
arguments and offers are intended to deceive, and when they work,
as they often do, the party making them reaps real benefits at the
expense of the adversary.  One might expect communitarians to es-
chew behavior of this sort, but one would be disappointed.  Like
almost everyone else, communitarians seem to understand that it is
not prudent to expose one’s goals, options, resources, and plans
unilaterally, and that it is sensible to give oneself room to back
away from positions that turn out to be untenable, even if this
means being deceptive in the process.  At some level behavior of
this sort simply reflects one of the most basic teachings of evolution
and natural selection: that acting in one’s individual interest is the
best way to act in the interests of the group.
Some ADR scholars deal with the issues of deception and
competition by arguing that humans should rise to the level of
ADR rather than ADR sink to the level of humans, so to speak.
Proponents of the theory of Transformative Dispute Resolution
(TDR), for example, believe that using TDR methods can change
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people from secretive, suspicious, insecure, self-centered, competi-
tive, and greedy adversaries into transparent, trusting, confident,
cooperative, and sharing colleagues.102  The evidence for this hope-
ful claim comes mostly from “just so” stories103 about single dis-
putes in which parties using TDR methods allegedly changed
character during the course of their disputing.  It is not possible to
prove a transformation from a single data point, however, and the
TDR literature provides no examples of follow-up stories about
future disputes, or personal ethnographies describing changes in
other parts of the parties’ lives, to establish that transformations
have occurred.  Even the transformations in TDR’s “just so” sto-
ries can be explained in non-transformative terms.104  TDR propo-
nents seem to assume that character is formed in “Road to
Damascus” moments that shake values, beliefs, and character to
their foundations and remake personalities forever.  But becoming
a different person is a slow, relentless, repetitive, tedious, serendip-
itous, and self-critical process that is ill-adapted to the infrequent,
context-specific, emotionally charged, and discontinuous nature of
102 See, e.g., ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).  Or at least
proponents of TDR used to say they believed this.  The second edition of THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION created some uncertainty about what Transformative Dispute Resolution seeks to
transform.  The first version of the theory claimed to transform people, but after that claim was
criticized for being psychologically naı̈ve, proponents of the theory seemed to shift their focus
from people to processes in the revised version of the theory and claim that TDR transformed
disputing rather than disputants.  The uncertainty arises from the fact that TDR proponents
deny that they did this. Id.  I discuss this issue at greater length in Condlin, The Curious Case of
Transformative Dispute Resolution, supra note 16.  Professors Shaffer and Cochran defended
another version of the transformation argument, one grounded in religious doctrine, though they
saw transformation as an experience visited by lawyers on clients for the clients’ own good. See
Condlin, “What’s Love Got To Do With It?,” supra note 30, at 271–96 (discussing the Shaffer/ R
Cochran view). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transfor-
mation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217, 240 (1995)
(“[M]ediation is transformative because it is educational. . .  [W]e learn about other people,
other ways to conceptualize problems, ways to turn crises into opportunities, creative new ways
to resolve complex issues and interact with each other.”).
103 See RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES (1902) (“just so” stories are deliberately fanciful
tales explaining animal characteristics to children).  The stories often amount to little more than
unverifiable and unfalsifiable illustrations of what the authors believe to be ideal behavioral
practices. See Condlin, The Curious Case of Transformative Dispute Resolution, supra note 16,
at 629 n.46, 646 (describing how “most of the case studies [used as evidence of party transforma-
tion] . . . are reconstructions of mediation sessions rather than verbatim transcriptions”).
104 See Condlin, “Nature” of Legal Dispute Bargaining, supra note 9, at 631–45, 652–68 (rein- R
terpreting the TDR “just so” stories to show no character transformations).
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most disputing.105  Disputing does not bring out the best in people
unless it is ready to come out on its own.
V. ADR—THE FUTURE
Its weaknesses and limitation notwithstanding, the ADR re-
form movement is likely to make a number of major changes to the
dispute resolution landscape in this country and abroad.  At a mini-
mum, if law firm biographies are to be believed, it already has pro-
duced a new and sizeable cohort of lawyers with ADR dispute
resolution skills of various types and at various levels of profi-
ciency, who are available to help parties resolve disputes outside
the formal judicial system, and more and more people will take
advantage of that opportunity as it becomes more widely known.106
One might think of these lawyers collectively as a dispute resolu-
tion system in their own right, lacking only a formal organizational
structure for official institutional status.
In addition, public entities worldwide have created formal
ADR systems of various types and are beta-testing them, in effect,
as we speak.107  Eventually, many of these systems are likely to be-
come official institutions in their own right, dividing the dispute
resolution workload with courts (and in some instances replacing
courts altogether)108 along a “big case/small case” line.109  In this
105 I describe the moral and psychological dimensions of character change in greater detail in
Robert J. Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAW-
YERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 319–32 (David Luban ed., 1983). Character change, in
part, is a therapeutic process and TDR theory disavows any claim to equip one to do therapy,
though others in the ADR movement are less modest. See Jeffrey R. Seul, How Transformative
Is Transformative Mediation?: A Constructive-Developmental Assessment, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 135 (1999); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L.
REV. 605, 607 (2006) (“[L]awyers thus inevitably are therapeutic agents. Once this insight is
absorbed, it is transformative.”); Benston & Farkas, supra note 19, at 658 (“[M]illennial students R
are more adept at parsing others’ personal and professional narratives and understanding their
own roles in complex interpersonal interactions.”).
106 Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 519 (describing the widespread distribution of mediation R
skills among lawyers).  Pressure to use the skills could come from lawyers as well as clients.  As
one version of what often is referred to as Kaplan’s Law has it, “If you give a kid a hammer,
[soon] he. . . [or she will discover] that everything needs pounding.” See If Your Only Tool Is a
Hammer Then Every Problem Looks Like a Nail, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, https://quoteinvesti-
gator.com/2014/05/08/hammer-nail/#return-note-8840-8.
107 See supra note 46.
108 The expectation in China is that all court hearings eventually will be held online. See
Tashea, supra note 46, at 26 (“[I]t’s just a matter of time to get this technology nationwide.”). R
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vision of the future, ADR systems typically will be responsible for
low-stakes, standardized, routine, and uncomplicated matters (both
entire cases and issues within complex cases), where convenience,
efficiency, economy, and predictability are the overriding con-
cerns,110 and courts will (continue to) be responsible for large scale,
complicated, substantive disputes where legal, moral, and political
judgments are called for.111  This shift in the dispute resolution di-
vision of labor is likely to reduce the size of the docket for many
courts and permit them to focus more extensively on complex mat-
ters in which interpreting the law is more important than resolving
the disputes.  Whether ADR and litigation will exist interdepen-
dently in such a world as complementary parts of a single institu-
tion or separately as free-standing entities, each having the
authority to make final, binding, and preclusive decisions in its own
right, is hard to say, though some versions of both models are likely
to survive.112  The only remaining issue will be defining the differ-
109 At the Pound Conference this line sometimes was described as one between “garbage
cases” and “more important cases.” See Laura Nader, A Reply to Professor King, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 99, 100–01 (1994). See also Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 6, at 639–40, R
650–51 (describing future relationship of ADR systems to courts in dividing the dispute resolu-
tion caseload).
110 ADR methods and systems have a role to play in complex disputes as well as simple ones,
of course, but it is more of a supporting role than a leading one.  Mediation, for example, often is
used to work out the details involved in implementing judicial decisions in class actions, civil
rights, mass torts, and other complex, multi-party, multi-issue lawsuits, as well as resolve dis-
agreements that arise in the enforcement of complex business deals, employment contracts (e.g.,
for sports and entertainment figures, and high-paid executives), mergers and acquisitions, and
other complicated legal transactions and arrangements in which all of the issues that could be-
come disputed at some point in time cannot be anticipated, and their resolutions worked out,
fully, in advance. See, e.g., Elizabeth “Wendy” Trachte-Huber, Mediating Multi-Party Disputes:
Reflections on Leadership in Mediation, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 195 (2004) (describing the
work involved in mediating large, complex, multiparty disputes).  As a consequence, complex
transactions and arrangements of this sort often are left incomplete by design, in the belief that
disputes about details inevitably will arise and that when they do the parties involved will have
the best information about, and best access to, resources and methods for dealing with them.
Whether ADR methods are equally useful in the initial decision stage of large-scale, norm-gov-
erned, legal disputes is not so clear.
111 See Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 565 (explaining how ADR methods do not provide R
the tools necessary to dispose of all kinds of disputes).  Small cases sometimes can involve novel
and difficult issues of law, morality, and politics with implications well beyond those for the
parties involved in the disputes, and a complete dispute resolution system will include a proce-
dure for moving such cases from the ADR to the judicial docket.  Sometimes, “big” is just a
synonym for “important,” and all kinds of cases can be important.
112 See Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 547 (“Without the infrastructure provided by courts R
. . . the outcomes of many ADR proceedings would be non-binding and unenforceable.”); James
Maxeiner, The Federal Rules at 75: Dispute Resolution, Private Enforcement or Decisions Ac-
cording to Law?, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 983 (2014).
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ence between “big” and “small” cases, and if past experience with
other judicial diversion programs is a guide, that problem will re-
main on the table for some time to come.113
While ADR in its most ambitious forms purports to remake
institutions, values, character, and culture, ultimately it is likely to
have its greatest effect on dispute resolution practices and skills,
likely to produce a new Federal Rules, so to speak, more than a
new Equity Jurisprudence.  Apart from its structural reconfigura-
tion of the tribal elder as neutral, ADR’s most notable contribution
to dispute resolution reform to date has been the adaptation of a
set of communication practices and techniques (e.g., “active listen-
ing,” “reflection,” “framing,” “reactive devaluation,” “anchoring,”
and the like) that are useful for investigating, understanding, and
reconciling conflicting views but that are not original with or
unique to ADR.  For the most part they are the skill practices of
“client centered representation” introduced into legal education by
the clinical education movement in the nineteen-seventies,114 and
the methods and techniques of the “heuristics and biases” model of
human decision-making introduced into legal education by the be-
havioral economics literature in the 1990s.115
It does not diminish ADR to say that it resuscitates well-
known concepts, skills, and methods, or that it is likely to produce
a new Federal Rules rather than a new Equity Jurisprudence.  Skill
is the driving force behind the effective operation of any dispute
113 See Sally T. Hillsman, Pretrial Diversion of Youthful Adults: A Decade of Reform and
Research, 7 JUST. SYSTEM J. 361, 361–87 (1982) (describing attempts over the years to identify
the types of juvenile criminal cases that should be included in pre-trial diversion programs, con-
cluding that “there are endemic conditions in [the litigation process] that make it. . . difficult for
[various alternatives to achieve the goals reformers and program operators intended].”).
114 See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTER-
VIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); ROBERT REDMOUNT &
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); ANDREW S. WATSON,
THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976).
115 Korobkin, supra note 76, at 1789; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barri- R
ers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994); Chris
Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 43; Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 163 (2000); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment &
Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2017 (2006); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and
Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2004); Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchor-
ing, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 597 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996).  I discuss this literature in Robert J. Condlin, Legal Bargaining
Theory’s New “Prospecting” Agenda: It May Be Social Science, But Is It News?, 10 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L. J. 215, 217–24 (2010).
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resolution system.  It enables parties to identify and express inter-
ests and objectives clearly, understand differences accurately, cir-
cumvent and dissolve conflicts creatively, and build the social
bonds needed for joint action.116  Dispute system structures can be
more or less supportive of different kinds of skills, but in the end, it
is skill proficiency more than system design that makes dispute res-
olution work.  Adding to the package of previously known skills is
an important contribution to dispute resolution reform, therefore,
even if it is not the identification of a radically new conception of
disputing, or the invention of an innovative new system for resolv-
ing disputes.
Finally, ADR’s jurisprudential effects may end up being as, if
not more, significant than its institution-building and skill develop-
ment ones.117  In many types of disputes, for example, ADR may
replace a legal rule-based system of decision-making with a bu-
reaucratic processing one,118 resolving disputes according to a set
of practices and beliefs that treat disputes as commodities and res-
olutions as standardized.  ADR systems operate in private, are not
subject to any type of public review or critique, and thus are free to
serve whatever interests they please, including their own, without
fear of discovery or criticism.  Resolving small scale, standardized
disputes over and over again cannot help but become routine (and
boring) and the most efficient way to deal with routine matters is
to follow the same procedures and reach essentially the same re-
sults, often unselfconsciously, each time out.  Routinizing dispute
resolution in this way has the added attraction, at least for those
who do not think carefully about it, of making the process seem
fairer as well as more efficient, since treating everyone identically
116 Skill, as I use the term, has an emotional and cognitive dimension and is not just tech-
nique.  For “active listening” to work, for example, the listener must be interested in what the
speaker has to say, be open to the possibility that the comments could be correct, and want to
understand what is being said, not just counter it.
117 Professor Main describes how ADR already is responsible for “the [changes in the] plead-
ing and summary judgment standards that exemplify contemporary practice . . . [as well as] the
vanishing trial, . . . judicial case management and the pursuit of settlement by any means neces-
sary.” See Main, Mediation, supra note 3, at 542, 562–64. R
118 Ironically, the bureaucratization of dispute resolution coincides almost perfectly with
Chief Justice Burger’s call at the outset of the ADR movement for “new machinery for resolving
disputes.” See Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. – A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 15
JUDGES J. 27 (1978).  If hospitals and corporations could take advantage of business manage-
ment techniques, Burger argued, so could the legal system. See WARREN BURGER, The Courts
on Trial, Speech at the American Bar Association (Feb. 21, 1956), in DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 4, 6
(1990).
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(rather than equivalently) can seem like treating them equally, and
ADR is committed to equal treatment.
ADR proponents deny that this will happen, of course, and
argue that ADR’s flexible structure is better adapted to resolving
disputes in individually tailored ways than is adjudication’s fixed
format.  This may be true, but given the secrecy with which ADR
operates, it will take a very long time to know for sure if it is, and
in the end, again given the secrecy, we might never know.  The
architects of administrative regulation did not anticipate the prob-
lem of regulatory capture, for example, but it occurred nonethe-
less.  The attractions of bureaucratic processing are considerable
and there is no reason to believe ADR systems will be less suscep-
tible to them than other administrative regulatory systems.  In
some ways, in fact, ADR systems may be more susceptible since,
unlike administrative systems, they are not required to explain or
justify their decisions in public where they can be monitored and
criticized.  ADR systems treat party satisfaction rather than correct
legal judgments as the best evidence of successful performance and
often equate satisfaction with procedure as the equivalent of satis-
faction with results.  But, as we have seen, parties who are treated
respectfully can be satisfied with outcomes that are both incorrect
and unfair.  The standard objection to bureaucratization—that it
represents a capitulation to modern social conditions more than an
improved conception of justice119—has lost much of its force since
the nineteen-eighties.  In an increasingly congested and conflictual
world, many now think of justice in collective rather than individu-
alistic terms,120 and equal treatment as the right to be treated iden-
tically rather than equivalently to others.121  This paints a bleak
picture of the future for those who believe that legal rights are indi-
vidualistic and contextual in nature, but it may be ADR’s most im-
119 See Fiss, supra note 8. R
120 This already is true for personal jurisdiction doctrine in lawsuits based on standardized
transactions. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (Plaintiffs bound by a
forum selection clause they did not know about, had not read, and did not understand because
the clause was fair to consumers in the aggregate). See also Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to
the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873
(2005) (describing efforts by victims of mass torts to circumvent the requirement of individual
causation by filing actions on behalf of collective plaintiffs to impose liability on collective defen-
dant-manufacturers).
121 Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L. J. 1681 (1992); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sen-
tencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991).
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portant legacy.122  If that turns out to be the case, welcome to 2081
and say hello to Harrison Bergeron.123
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADR reform movement may turn out to be one of the
most important chapters in the history of American civil dispute
resolution, or it may not.  Unlike its well-known ancestors—Equity
Jurisprudence, Small Claims Court, and the Federal Rules—ADR
turns dispute resolution on its head by transferring control over
outcome from agents of the state and other third parties to the
disputants themselves, and by redefining disputing procedure in ad
hoc, party-constructed guidelines rather than fixed, generic, and
categorical rules.  In doing this, ADR rejects many of the principles
of substantive and procedural justice underlying the American sys-
tem of adversarial adjudication and replaces them with informal,
collaborative, and communal substitutes.  A transformation of this
magnitude may be more than many ADR proponents have in
mind, but it is one possible consequence of the widespread adop-
tion of ADR reforms.
Looked at more modestly, on the other hand, ADR might
simply be a next-generation version of private ordering, an aug-
mented form of face-to-face, multi-party124 bargaining in which
third-party neutrals help disputants identify their individual inter-
ests and find common ground when they are unable to do so for
themselves but, unlike judges, do not tell the disputants how to act
on that information once they have it.  A system of augmented bar-
gaining of this sort, a kind of bargaining for the bargaining im-
paired,125 has much to recommend it.  It is inexpensive to
122 In a sense, some of the jurisprudential effects of ADR already have been felt. See Main,
supra note 3, at 562–64 (describing how the availability of mediation changed the judicial inter- R
pretation of the pleading and summary judgment rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
123 See KURT VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE; A COLLECTION OF SHORT
STORIES (New York, Delacorte Press 1968) (in the year 2081, the 211th, 212th, and 213th amend-
ments to the Constitution declare that all Americans are absolutely equal “in every which
way”—no one is allowed to be smarter, better-looking, or more physically able than anyone
else).
124 ADR is multi-party bargaining in the sense that the neutral is one more person to be
convinced that one’s arguments are correct and one’s concessions are final.  A party bargains
with both the adversary and the neutral in an ADR system, in other words, and this added
complexity is one more reason repeat players have an advantage.
125 When parties are able to resolve disputes by themselves, they do so.  And if they need
someone to tell them what to do, they go to court.  ADR is for parties caught between these two
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implement and easy to use.  It generates new business for lawyers
and creates new scholarly agendas for legal academics.  And it
makes private party autonomy first-among-equals in the range of
interests protected in the resolution of disputes.  All of these fea-
tures, but particularly the last, make ADR a natural vehicle for
structuring disputing in a democracy.
If there is a fly in the ointment, and almost always there is, it is
that ADR may fall victim to the familiar propensity of administra-
tive systems generally to bureaucratize decision-making by defin-
ing legal rights in collective rather than individual terms,
standardizing results, and giving repeat players disproportionate
power over outcome.  If this scenario materializes, and particularly
if ADR is extended to all types of disputes both large and small,
some of the most important commitments underlying the Ameri-
can system of justice will be up for grabs.  There is no way to know
for sure how things will play out, of course, it is still early in the
game and trustworthy data is hard to come by.  But there is reason
to be vigilant about the unanticipated effects of ADR, and reason
to keep it on a very short leash.
options, who want to retain personal control over their disputes but need help to resolve them.
Thus, “bargaining for the bargaining impaired.”  ADR scholars use the term “facilitated negotia-
tion” as a synonym.
